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I. 
With the bombings in London on 7th July last year and the attempted bombings that followed 
soon afterwards (on 21st July and the arrest of the young men in connection with these), the figure 
of the terrorist altered or expanded from that which it had recently become to include not a threat 
to the nation from outside but also the fear of the ‘terrorist within’.  The Anti Terrorism, Crime 
and Security Act 2001 and The Terrorism Act 2000 before it had mainly worked with an image of 
the ‘foreign threat’; but the impact of these events (like the British shoe-bombers and the suicide 
bombers in Tel Aviv) was such that this image already altering, was firmly established in the 
public imagination.   Our ‘own’ ‘home grown’ terrorists are not only those who joined attacks 
elsewhere, but are prepared to stage attacks on British soil.  The language of the home-grown 
terrorist who has undergone rapid ‘radicalisation’ is used in the recently published Intelligence 
and Security Committee’s Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005’ (May 2006) 
The Terrorism Act 2006, which the Home Office is keen to point out was already being planned 
and is not to be seen as a response to the July attacks (see government website 
www.ukresilience.info), attempts to address this through the criminalisation of encouragement, 
glorification and involvement in the preparation of terrorist activity.   
 
After the July 7th attacks, in this period of high security alert - especially around the vulnerability 
of the London transport system - a young Brazilian man, Jean Charles de Menezes, was shot dead 
by police in a train in Stockwell underground station.  When, through a leak from the 
investigation by the IPCC, it became clear that Jean Charles de Menezes was not the suspected 
terrorist around whom the surveillance team and their backup intelligence had been mobilised, it 
seemed to many that we are living in a time in which as Walter Benjamin had predicted, the state 
of exception had become the norm.  Not because this young man was shot, exactly, but because 
his killing made clear that the police were operating a policy as part of their response to the threat 
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of suicide bombers – Operation Kratos – that legally allowed the use of fatal force.  In effect it 
allowed this killing not to be a murder. 
 
While radical groups and commentators quickly called this as a shoot to kill policy, the 
Metropolitan police issued a report to their members regarding the prevention of suicide 
terrorism in which the author (Swain) says ‘this is not a shoot to kill policy’ (Suicide terrorism’ 27 
October 2005).  He then continues to explain that police shooting a suspect is in accordance with 
the Criminal Law Act and, contrary to public perception, there is no requirement to give warning.  
To date, no one has been prosecuted about this killing. 
 
Like the foreign suspect who can be incarcerated without need for criminal prosecution under the 
Terrorism Act (if cannot be deported), the suicide bomber is seemingly considered a threat to the 
‘life of the nation’ such that derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights is 
allowed.  (ECHR allows the right to life to be derogated (suspended) in relation to deaths resulting 
from lawful acts of war.?  But this is a presumption since no derogation sought)  In this precise 
sense, this is a war not only in the rhetorical terms of a war on terrorism, but in the sense that the 
right to life is suspended. 
 
Giorgio Agamben argued that the homo sacer is precisely the one who can be killed without being 
murdered.  What is the relevance of his theory here? 
 
Agamben’s discussion of homo sacer returns us to this archaic figure of Roman law, the traits of 
which seem contradictory (1998:71).  The term sacer means both sacred and damned.  The homo 
sacer was the ‘one whom the people have judged on account of a crime.  It is not permitted to 
sacrifice this man, yet he who kills him will not be condemned for homicide…this is why it is 
customary for a bad or impure man to be called sacred.’(quoting Pompeius Festus, 1993:71).  This 
seems contradictory because it confirms the sacredness of a person, while also allowing – or 
rendering unpunishable – his killing (1993:72). More contradictory still when it is understood 
that he could not be put to death according to ritual practices (1993:72).  The Romans also found 
it obscure: Macrobius sates that ‘I am not unaware that it appears strange to some people that 
while it is forbidden to violate any sacred thing whatsoever, it is permitted to kill the sacred 
man.’(72).  The two elements – the unpunishability of his killing and the ban on his sacrifice – are 
difficult to explain together (72-3).  How is it possible to kill the homo sacer without 
contaminating oneself or committing sacriliege?  Agamben argues that the homo sacer is a limit 
figure, between the juridical realms of the divine and the human and that cannot be explained 
satisfactorily within only one of these realms.  The figure may allow us, he writes ‘to uncover an 
originary political structure located in a zone prior to the distinction between sacred and profane, 
religious and juridical’(1993:74). 
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There is a political structure at stake, for Agamben, one that follows on the distinction between 
life as political (bios) and life as the simple fact of living – bare or naked life (zoe).  The related 
distinction central to Schmitt’s work informs Agamben here, that is, the distinction between the 
People and the people that haunts modern politics: on the one hand the sovereign’s legitimacy 
rests upon the people’s acceptance of his exception (they agree to be a people in the sense that 
they give the sovereign the monopoly on violence, the right to use the violence which they 
renounce); on the other, there is the people as mass.  The ‘remainder’ of the first, then, are those 
who are in the system but not of it, those who are ambiguously placed and who can so easily 
become understood as a remainder, an impure in relation to the purity of those (good) people 
who are politically subjected in both senses of the word.  Agamben’s work on Auschwitz 
‘Remnants of Auschwitz’ is precisely about how bare life can be produced – the Nazis were 
meticulous about stripping the Jews of their nationality before extermination, removing it so that 
they became living beings without being People – in the midst of the political. 
 
The homo sacer is a limit figure between the human and the divine – he is ‘set outside human 
jurisdiction without being brought into the realm of divine law’(82).  He cannot be sacrificed so he 
is not, Agamben argues, the same as one who is consecrated – the one who is banned and given 
over to the gods – as anthropological works of late nineteenth and early twentieth century had 
suggested.  If it is licit to kill the sacred man, he is excepted both from the realm of the human and 
from the realm of the divine.  There is ‘more than a mere analogy’ with the sovereign; because the 
sovereign is an exceptional case with regard to law – law applies by no longer applying to the 
sovereign, by withdrawing from it (as in the phrase ‘the exception that proves the rule’) – so the 
homo sacer belongs to God in his unsacrificeability and is included (thereby) in the human 
community by being able to be killed.  
 
Homo sacer is abandoned therefore – existing somewhere in relation to the law and to God but in 
neither realm.  The homo sacer could be seen Agamben argues as connected to the sovereign 
decision that suspends law in the state of exception and thus implicates bare life within that state.  
‘Beyond penal law and sacrifice’ he writes, ‘homo sacer presents the originary figure of life taken 
into the sovereign ban and preserves the memory of the originary exclusion through which the 
political dimension was first constituted.’(p83).  That is, the production of political life – the life 
of the People constituted through their relationship with the sovereign as the exception – rests 
upon the banning of bare life. The homo sacer is the one who has been caught (out, and in!) in 
this constitution, the ‘human victim’, the bare life which reveals or reminds us of the ‘originary 
activity of sovereignty’.(1998:83).  Only the sovereign can produce bare life because he is the one 
who produces the limit, the relationship between the People and the people, between their lives as 
politico-juridical subjects and their lives as living beings, and who thereby defines who is caught 
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in the ‘space’ between, ie.the one who may be killed without committing an offence in relation to 
human or divine law. In the imposition of the sovereign bond, all human (bare) life is exposed or 
abandoned to an unconditional capacity to be killed. We have established that homo sacer is the 
one who is not taken into the sovereign bond – who is excepted from it.  But the homo sacer has a 
relation to that bond, of course, not only because he is constituted (or produced) by it but also 
because he mirrors it and serves as a ‘reminder’ of it.  Homo sacer is the included exclusion of the 
sovereign decision (1998:85), the one without whom the sovereign bond does not make sense, 
does not constitute or construct anything. 
 
To return to the killing of Jean Charles de Menezes. On the morning of the killing of this young 
man, a colleague of mine in the sociology department and I crossed paths in the corridor. We 
spoke about the news that a man had been shot by police, and my colleague commented that she 
hoped that they were just shooting any one who looked a bit different.  To which I replied 
something to the effect of ‘they’d have a task on their hands in London!’  Hers was a response 
typical o f ‘us sociologists’, a leftist critical remark dismissive of the establishment and not least 
the police, their actions and their intelligence.  We have grown familiar with police racism, their 
use of violence, and incidents in which the two combine.   
 
Certainly there was horrified recognition at the revelation that the police intelligence still 
employed the notion of ‘mongolian eyes’ as they attempted to identify the man they were staking 
out at the address of flats in Tulse Hill, South London, where Jean Charles de Menzes also 
happened to be living.  Mongolian eyes, the Lombroso reference! 
 
But to understand this event as an example of the continuity of police racism is perhaps to miss 
something.    It is to miss – because it is absolutely impossible to distinguish the example from the 
exception in terms of their manifestation (Agamben, 1998) – the possibility of considering the 
relation that the sovereign has to the homo sacer.  This is not police racism as we knew it even five 
years ago.  Nor is it best understood as the result of police blunders or stupidity.  It is the problem 
of sovereign practice itself.  The sovereign may of course regret the use of violence, may blame it 
on exceptional times etc. but in name of protecting the People from the people, the right to use 
such violence is always there, primary and definitional.  (Not because the people give up their 
right to life – the exclusive inclusion of bare life means that life is included not surrendered.)  
Because the question of how to distinguish the two groups people and People becomes a 
hermeneutic exercise, it can manifest itself in the world as something akin to racism, a reading of 
the body or profile – the ‘radicalised Muslim will be …’ (that is ridiculous).  Incidentally, this 
problem of distinguishing in order to know how to respond is also apparent in the internet 
discussions as people tried to decide how to respond affectively to the shooting: was he someone 
who was in the right ‘set’ for the British to mourn, or to feel sympathy for (especially in terms of 
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compensation for his family in Brazil) – discussions turned on questions of membership such as 
whether his visa valid, etc, and while people confessed to being pleased at first because they had 
been led to believe that a suicide bomber had been killed, others refused the constitution of 
populations because he was any one of us, someone’s son. 
 
 I want to argue that on the one hand Jean Charles de Menezes was not homo sacer – not 
any one could have killed this man – while on the other, and in another sense, he was, precisely 
because his killing serves as a reminder or the link between sovereign power and violence, the 
sovereign’s ability to produce bare life.  Moreover, no where have I seen an attempt by the 
authorities to present his death as a sacrifice, which one might in a sense have expected from the 
talk of the difficulties of the ‘war on terror’ – while at the same time there is a sense in which the 
path of pursuing the war on terror has not been interrupted by this ‘tragic event’ (Met police 
statement), merely intensified the government’s insistence that distinguishing the radicalised and 
potentially radicalisable from the rest is a priority (response to Report on July 7 bombings), 
alongside the recently announced need to teach the core values more forcefully in schools (May 
15th 2006 The Guardian).   
 
Agamben likens the homo sacer (drawing on Jhering , 1998:104) to the wargus (wolf-
man) in ancient Germanic law.  Scholars have argued that ancient Germanic law was founded on 
the concept of peace and the exclusion of the wrong-doer from the community.  The wrong-doer 
became the one without peace (friedlos) and the one whom anyone could kill without committing 
homocide.  In medieval law the one who is banned from the community has a liminal status, and 
Agamben argues that the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon sources underline the bandit’s liminal status 
by defining him as a ‘wolf-man’.  ‘In the collective unconscious as a monstrous hybrid of human 
and animal, dividied between the forest and the city’ , the werewolf, banned from the city, is 
neither one nor the other, ‘a threshold of indistinction and of passage between animal and 
man’(1998:105).  The sovereign’s position is maintained by such a ban, not by a contract; the 
sovereign’s ban of the were-wolf.  Tracing this idea, Agamben points out that in legend and 
medieval narrative poetry one can find the image of the werewolf as a temporary metamorphosis; 
the temporary nature ‘corresponds perfectly to the state of exception during which time the city is 
dissolved and men enter into a zone in which they are no longer distinct from the beasts.’  But his 
point here is that this also applies to the sovereign – there is an intimate link between the 
werewolf and the sovereign /king – as the lays/stories Agamben  draws upon illustrate eg. in the 
lay the wolf-man ends up going to live with the sovereign and being transformed back into a man 
on the king’s bed.   
 
The two – the homo sacer or wolf-man and the sovereign – are intimate because both 
have the potential to turn into beasts.  The wolfman reminds us of the potential to revert to the 
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beast that is not left behind but accompanies the ‘political contract’.  But so too and correlatively, 
the sovereign has just this potential (to become the beast) since the originary political act 
establishes his ability (and protects his right) so to do.  The establishment of the political can no 
longer be seen as leaving the state of nature behind through the establishment of contract.   The 
state of nature is included in as an exclusion.  And ‘in the person of the sovereign, the werewolf, 
the wolf-man of man, dwells permanently in the city.’(1998:107).  
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